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Abstract 
This working paper (which is also available as an electronic document on the INTERNET at 
http://www.iiasa,ac.at/Research/LUC/Papers/gkh 11) analyzes the most recent population 
assessments and projections (the 1996 edition), conducted by the United Nations Population 
Division, New York. Its main objective is to cut through the maze of available data and 
identify ten demographic trends, which are most relevant for studying global (land-use) 
change. 
The paper also discusses possibilities for improving the accuracy of population projections by 
applying probabilistic methods or a scenario approach. Finally, the paper analyzes factors that 
might affect future trends in world population growth, such as global food constraints or a 
widespread health crisis due to AIDS. 
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World Population Prospects 
Analyzing the 1996 UN Population Projections 
Gerhard K. Heilig 
What is this paper about? 
This paper, which is also available as an electronic document (http://www.iiasa.ac.at/ 
ResearchILUCI - WP-96-146), analyzes the most recent UN population assessments and 
projections (the 1996 edition), conducted by the United Nations Population Division, New 
York. Its main objective is to cut through the maze of available data and identify ten 
demographic trends which are most relevant for studying global (land-use) change. 
The future number of people on the globe, evidently, is an important anthropogenic factor of 
global change. However, even more important, will be their spatial distribution. This paper 
will emphasize the projected massive shift in population from the developed countries of 
Europe and Northern America to the future population giants of Asia and Africa. It will 
identify those countries that will add the largest number of people to the globe between now 
and 2050. We will also identify countries and regions that had the highest growth rates in the 
past. In a second chapter some methodological issues will be discussed - such as the question, 
whether probabilistic projections or scenario methods could improve the predictive capability 
of population projections. The final chapter of the document deals with issues that are often 
considered limiting factors of global population growth: food and epidemic disease 
(especially AIDS). 
Which data sources were used? 
The main data source are preliminary tables from the 1996 edition of the "World Population 
Prospects" (Annex I and 11) to be published by the United Nations Population Division in 
early 1997 (United Nations, 1997). These tables were available to the author in draft form. We 
have also used the most recent "World Population Profile: 1996" which is prepared in the 
International Programs Center of the United States Bureau of the Census Population Division 
(US Bureau of the Census, 1996). The third data source are the "IIASA Population Scenarios" 
and the "IIASA Probabilistic Population Projections Based On Expert Opinions" prepared by 
the IIASA Population Project (Lutz, 1996). 
Electronic version 
This paper is a hard copy of the IIASA Web document: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/ 
ResearchILUCIgkhl (version 1.4) on the Internet. Please check this page for updates of the 
paper. 
World Population: Major Trends 
World population will grow significantly - despite falling fertility. 
There is a most striking paradox in global population trends: on one hand we have had a rapid 
decline in fertility for over two decades in many developing countries - not to mention the 
already very low fertility in most of the highly developed nations; on the other hand we will 
almost certainly experience a further massive increase in the world's population. In their most 
recent projection ("World Population Assessment and Projection. The 1996 edition") the 
United Nations Population Division projects a global population of 8.04 billion for the year 
2025 and 9.37 billion for 2050 (see Figure Cl.1 and Table Cl.1). According to this medium 
variant, an increase of some 2.35 billion people can be expected worldwide between 1995 and 
2025; and an additional 1.3 billion between 2025 and 2050. 
These numbers are a little smaller than previous UN estimates, leading some mass media to 
jump to the conclusion that world population growth will be over soon. This rash judgment 
might be premature. This UN medium variant projection is based on the assumption that 
almost all countries worldwide will have a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of only 2.1 in 2050 at 
the latest (only for 10, mostly European countries, the UN assumes a TFR in 2050 that is a 
little less - between 1.84 and 2.1). This assumption would require a further steep fertility 
decline in many developing nations - especially in Pakistan, Nigeria, Iran or India, where the 
Total Fertility Rates are still far above the reproductive level of 2.1 children per woman. 
According to the most recent UN estimates, Pakistan for instance, currently has a TFR of 
about 5 children per woman - the medium variant projection assumes that it will drop to 2.1 
during the next 25 years. In other words, we will only have a world population of about 9.4 
billion by 2050, if the Total Fertility Rate, measured as a global average, declines from about 
3.0 in 1990-95 to the reproductive level of 2.1 children per woman in 2035-40. 
Obviously, there is no guarantee that this will happen. There could be a much higher increase 
in world population, as indicated by the "high" variant UN projection: If worldwide fertility 
would drop to only about 2.6 children per woman (instead of 2.1 as assumed in the medium 
variant), we would have a global population of some 8.6 billion by 2025 and 11.2 billion by 
2050. This would be equivalent to a 2.89 billion increase between 1995 and 2025 and a 2.58 
billion increase between 2025 and 2050. In other words, we cannot exclude another doubling 
of the world population between now and the middle of the next century as being projected by 
the UN high variant projection. 
Is it possible to completely stop world population growth during the next few decades? Yes, it  
is - if fertility, worldwide, would decline to 1.57 children per woman, the global population 
could stabilize at about 7.5 billion by 2025. This is the result of the 1996 UN low variant 
projections. Please note that this variant assumes a drastic drop of average fertility to a level 
of some 24% below replacement - in all countries worldwide. While such a steep decline, in 
fact, already happened in many European countries, i t  is rather unlikely that populous 
developing nations such as Pakistan, India, Indonesia or Nigeria - which greatly determine 
world population growth - would quickly follow this trend. 
The current annual population increase of about 80 million will remain constant until 
2015. 
Currently world population is growing by about 80 million people per year (see Figure C1.2). 
This is a little less than in the early 1990s when the growth was more than 85 million per year. 
According to the most recent UN medium variant projection this will change very little during 
the next decades. Only after 2015 will we observe a gradual decline of the annual population 
increase - reaching about 50 million by 2050. Thus, by the middle of the next century, world 
population growth (in absolute numbers) will have declined to the level of the early 1950s. 
However, this is only possible, if fertility - in all developing countries - falls to the 
"reproductive level" of 2.1 children per woman by 2050. For countries like India, Pakistan or 
Nigeria this is a long way to go. 
Between now and 2050 world population growth will be generated exclusively in 
developing countries. 
Between now and the middle of the next century world population will most likely increase 
by some 3.68 billion people - all of these increases will be contributed by the developing 
countries (see Table C1.2). In fact, the population of the developed nations as a group will 
most likely decline by almost 10 million people between now and the year 2050 - according to 
the UN medium variant projections. Most of this population growth in the developing world 
will occur during the next 30 years: between 1995 and 2025 the population in developing 
countries will increase by 2.3 billion; between 2025 and 2050 it will "only" grow by 1.39 
billion. 
Comparing the centennial growth of developed and developing countries reveals a dramatic 
divergence: The population of the developed countries as a group will have increased by less 
than 350 million between 1950 and 2050. The developing countries, on the other hand, will 
have an estimated 6.8 billion people more - thus almost quintupling their 1950 population. 
This modern "population explosion" in the Third World is not comparable to the demographic 
transition of Europe in the 18th and 19th century. It is a historically unique phenomenon. Both 
the absolute numbers of population increase and the growth rates are without historical 
precedence. No country in Europe has experienced annual population growth rates of more 
than 0.5 to 1 percerrt during its "high growth" period. 
World population increase is concentrated in Asia. 
From the 3.68 billion people that will be added to the world's population between 1995 and 
2050, Asia will contribute some 2 billion (see Figure C1.3 and Table C1.2). This enormous 
increase is due to the already massive size of the population. Most of this growth will occur in 
the next three decades. Between 1995 and 2025 Asia's population will grow by 1.35 billion - 
between 2025 and 2050 the increase is projected to be just 658 million (see Table C1.2). 
Despite a projected increase in mortality due to AIDS, we cannot expect a significant slowing 
down of population growth in Africa. This continent will contribute 1.3 billion people to the 
world's population between 1995 and the middle of the next century - almost twice as much as 
its current total population. Fertility is still so high in Sub-Saharan Africa that it can offset the 
effect of rising mortality. With an increase of 734 million over the next 30 years Africa's 
population will more than double. 
Latin America and the Caribbean, on the other hand, will have only a very moderate 
population increase of some 334 million between 1995 and 2050 - almost two-thirds (213 
million) during the next three decades. This is due to both the smaller initial size of the 
population and the already relatively low level of fertility. 
Europe's population will almost certainly decline - by 27 million over the next 30 years and 
by another 64 million between 2025 and 2050. Hence, the UN medium variant projection 
assumes a shrinking of Europe's population by some 9 1 million between 1995 and the middle 
of the next century. 
The ten countries which will contribute most to world population growth over the next 30 
years are India, China, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Indonesia, United States of America, 
Bangladesh, Zaire, and Iran - in that order! 
According to the most recent (medium variant) UN population projection, India's population 
will increase by an additional 401 million between 1995 and 2025 - China will grow by 
"only" 260 million (see Table C 1.3). The next largest contributor to world population growth - 
surprisingly - is not Indonesia which has the third largest population among developing 
countries, but Pakistan. This country's population will grow by about 133 million between 
1995 and 2025. An almost equal contribution to world population growth will probably come 
from Nigeria - 127 million. Perhaps unexpectedly, the next largest contributor to world 
population growth will be Ethiopia, which will have an additional 80 million people over the 
next three decades. Indonesia, on the other hand, will grow by "only" 78 million people - 
which is just sixth place in the "hit list" of contributors to world population growth. The 
United States of America will probably grow by 65 and Bangladesh by 62 million. Few 
development experts would have put Zaire on a watchlist for population growth. But this 
Central African country is projected to have an increase in population of almost 61 million 
between 1995 and 2025. The tenth largest contributor to world population growth will be Iran 
- with a population increase of almost 60 million during the next three decades (see Table 
C1.3). 
Which countries, worldwide, will have the highest increase in population during the 100-year 
period between 1950 and 2050? If the 1996 UN medium variant population assessments and 
projections are accurate (and there is no reason to believe otherwise) India will lead the group 
with an increase of 1.18 billion people - significantly larger than that of China, which will 
have a population increase of "only" 962 million (see Table C1.3). The third largest 
contributor to world population growth between 1950 and 2050 will be Pakistan with an 
increase of 318 million people. The ranking of the other 7 countries is as follows: Nigeria 
(+306 million); Indonesia (+ 239 million); Ethiopia (+ 194 million); United States of America 
(+ 190 million); Brazil (+ 189 million); Bangladesh (+ 176 million) and Iran (+ 153 million). 
Please note again that these data are all based on the most recent medium variant UN 
population projection, which assumes that all countries, worldwide, will reduce their average 
TFR to 2.1 children per woman by 2050. It is certainly possible, if not likely, that some of 
these countries, such as Pakistan or Iran, will not be able (or willing) to reduce average 
fertility to that level. In this case these countries would have an even higher increase i n  
population than reported above. 
By far the highest rates of population growth can be found in Western Asia and Africa, 
south of the Sahara. 
On a country-by-country basis it was mainly the oil-exporting nations of Western Asia that 
had the highest population growth rates over the past 45 years. According to the most recent 
UN assessment, the United Arab Emirates, for instance, had a mean annual growth rate of 
7.7% between 1950 and 1995 (which was equivalent to a continuous exponential growth rate 
of 1.4% over four and a half decades). This exceptionally rapid population growth was fueled 
by both very high rates of fertility and immigration. Extremely high growth rates were also 
estimated for Qatar, Western Sahara, Kuwait, Djibouti and Saudi Arabia (see Table C1.4). 
Between 1995 and 2025 more and more countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will be among those 
with the most rapidly growing population. Between 1995 and 2025 the fastest growing 
populations will that of the Gaza Strip, Liberia, Oman and Yemen. However, there will be 
also extremely high rates of population growth in Rwanda, Somalia, Niger, Ethiopia, and 
Angola. 
Which country will have the highest rate of population growth considering the whole century 
from 1950 to 2050? According to the UN medium variant population projection it will be the 
United Arab Emirates, with a spectacular mean annual population growth of 4%. If that 
projection is accurate, then the United Arab Emirates will have a continuous exponential 
population increase of 0.7% over a 100 year period. Most of the other "top ten" countries with 
high rates of centennial population growth are also oil-exporting nations of Western Asia. 
India will out-grow China. 
India has one of the oldest family planning programs. It started way back in the 1950s. The 
country's average fertility, however, declined only slowly. In the early 1950s both China and 
India had a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of about 6 children per woman. But while China's TFR 
sharply fell to about 2.4 in 1990, it declined only slowly in India and was still above 4 
children per woman i n  1990. This relatively slow decline of fertility has built up a huge 
population momentum in India. The country's population structure is much "younger" than 
that of China (see Figure C1.5). This "broad base" of children and young adults - born during 
the high growth period in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s - will enter reproductive age in the 
near future. Even if fertility continues to decline to reproductive level by 2020 (as being 
assumed by the UN projections) the Indian population will probably increase to almost 1.6 
billion by 2050 - slightly more than that of China (UN medium variant) (see Figure C1.4). 
However, India's population might become even much larger. If the average Total Fertility 
Rate would only decline to 2.6 (instead of 2.1) children per woman in 2020, the population 
would increase to about 1.9 billion by 2050 (see high UN variant in Figure C1.4). 
According to the UN low variant projection India's population would increase to 1.2 billion by 
2050. This would require an average TFR decline to 1.6 children per woman by 2010- 15 
(from currently around 2.9). For those who know India this does not seems a very likely 
scenario. 
Nigeria and Pakistan: emerging population giants 
There are not many countries in the world where population projections are more difficult to 
believe than in Nigeria. If the latest UN projections are correct then our children (and the 
younger among us) will watch the emergence of an African population giant, well comparable 
to the most populous Asian nations. In 1950 the West-African country had a population of 
about 33 million; since then the population has more than tripled. The UN Population 
Division estimates that Nigeria's population in 1995 was about 112 million (please note that 
the UN does not revise their estimate according to the most recent Nigerian census, which was 
significantly lower. Obviously, the UN Population and Statistical Divisions do not consider 
this census accurate enough). Between 1995 and the year 2050 the country's population will 
probably triple again and reach almost 339 million (see Figure C1.6). If this does occur, we 
will have a tenfold increase of a 33 million population within one century. This would have 
no historical precedence. And this is just the medium variant UN projection. Based on the 
demographic parameters it would be not impossible that Nigeria's population will grow even 
faster. 
There are several overwhelmingly Muslim populations with very high population growth 
rates, such as those of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates. But none of them is 
projected to have such a massive absolute increase of the population as Pakistan. In 1950 
Pakistan had a population of about 40 million people. Since then it has more than tripled and 
stood at 136 million in 1995. But the real population explosion in Pakistan will only come 
over the next few decades, because the country not only has a very young population, but also 
still an extremely high fertility - much higher, for instance, than in Bangladesh or Thailand. 
These large numbers of children and young adults will soon come into reproductive age and 
will produce a large number of offspring even if we assume, as in the UN medium variant, a 
rapid decline in average fertility to reproductive level (of 2.1 children per woman) by 2020. 
Pakistan's population will be about 357 million by 2050 (according to the UN medium variant 
projection) (see Figure C 1.6). 
High fertility in the early 1950s was not the only reason for the exceptional population growth 
in Nigeria and Pakistan. There were other countries which initially had a similar or even 
higher level of fertility. Consider the case of Bangladesh and Thailand. The Total Fertility 
Rate of Bangladesh during the early 1970s was as high as in Nigeria or Pakistan and the initial 
population size was quite comparable. Yet Bangladesh is projected to have a population of 
"only" 220 million by 2050 (as compared to 339 in Nigeria). Even more impressive are the 
demographic trends in Thailand, which reflect one of Asia's success stories in population 
control. The country's average TFR was comparable to that in Nigeria, but declined sharply in 
the early 1970s. This "saved" Thailand from building up this massive population momentum 
which characterizes the situation in Nigeria or Pakistan. Consequently Thailand will have 
only a very moderate population increase of 14.7 million between 1995 and 2050 (see Figure 
C1.6). 
The global balance of population has shifted significantly between 1950 and 1995. It will 
change even more dramatically between now and 2050. 
Europe's share of the world population has sharply declined from 21.7 to 12.8 percent - 
Africa's share, on the other hand, has increased from 8.9 to 12.7 %. Today, both Europe and 
Africa are each home to about one eighth of the world population. This will change 
significantly in the future. Europe's share of the global population will shrink to about 6.8 
percent in 2050. Africa's share will grow to 21.8 percent. Hence, one century of population 
growth will completely reverse Europe's and Africa's position: Europe's share of the global 
population in 2050 will be the same as that of Africa in 1950 - and vice versa. If the UN 
medium variant projections turn out to be correct (and there is no sign that they may be 
wrong) we have to expect a dramatic change in the global balance of population: A much 
bigger share of the world's population will live in Africa South of the Sahara. In only some 50 
years Western Africa, for instance, will have the same population as all of Europe. Eastern 
Africa will have many more people than all the countries of South America, the Caribbean 
and Oceania combined. 
Worldwide, the population will age. 
Over the next decades the world population will inevitably age. This is an unavoidable 
consequence of large birth cohorts during the 1950s and 1960s and the rapid fertility decline 
since the 1970s. In 2025 the "baby boomers" of the 1950s and 60s will be between 65 and 75 
years of age. These large aging cohorts are followed by the relatively small "baby bust" 
generations of the worldwide fertility decline. 
In 1950 there were only 131 million people aged 65 and older; in 1995 their number had 
almost tripled and was estimated at 37 1 million. Between now and 2025 the number will more 
than double again; and by 2050 we will probably have more than 1.4 billion elderly 
worldwide (see Figure C1.7). The percentage of elderly increased from 5.2 in 1950 to 6.2 in 
1995. By 2050 one out of ten people worldwide will be 65 years of age or more. 
While currently population aging is most serious in Europe and Japan, China will experience 
a dramatic increase in the proportion of elder people by the middle of the next century. This is 
largely due to the country's success in family planning, which rapidly reduced the relative size 
of birth cohorts since the 1970s. 
Methodology 
The Population Momentum 
There is little doubt that the world's population will grow for quite some time, as being 
projected by the most recent UN World Population Assessment. Of course we can imagine 
massive natural catastrophes such as the world being hit by a huge meteor; we can also 
speculate about the emergence of a highly contagious lethal virus for which no cure or 
immunization can be found (Garrett, 1994); or we might fear a worldwide nuclear war that 
would result in sudden, irreversible climate change - but short of these highly unlikely events 
(see: Budiansky, 1995) nothing could stop the global population from increasing another few 
billion people. Why are we so sure about this? 
First, there is a driving force concealed in the "young" age structure of the world population 
that just cannot be switched off (see Figure C2.1). Due to high fertility in the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s in many developing countries large numbers of women (and men) are currently 
entering reproductive age. The world is full of young adults that will have children. Even if 
each couple has a smaller number of children than their parents the total number of offspring 
will be substantial. This "echo effect" of a high-fertility period in the past creates a 
"population momentum" which works against changes in reproductive behavior that favor 
smaller families. 
Second, it is highly unlikely that large populations will change their reproductive behavior 
instantly. Certain sections of a population, such as highly educated middle-class couples in 
urban areas, might adopt radical behavioral change almost overnight, but many developing 
countries still have large rural populations where fertility is linked to deep-rooted cultural 
values or social conditions and can decline only gradually over two or three generations. We 
must also take into account that the average fertility of a population is a composite measure 
which results from the reproductive behavior of several parent cohorts: these include couples 
which already have a certain number of children and can only reduce the number of additional 
offspring. Even in a country like China, where we have the most rigorous family planning 
program and a highly controlled society, it took 20 years to reduce average fertility from 
about 6 to 2.4 children. In India - according to UN projections - this process might take 60 
years or more. 
These two basic facts, which are well known among demographers, tend to slow-down 
demographic change. They can produce a considerable time-lag between the first signs of a 
fertility decline and a slow-down of population growth. In fact, it is quite typical for 
developing countries that the total number of birth increases for one or even two decades, 
while the fertility (that is the average number of children per women) already declines. 
The divergent trends of population growth and fertility decline become apparent when we plot 
indices of the Total Fertility Rate, the average annual increase of the population and the 
annual population growth rates. For the five-year period of 1950-55 the indices are set to 100 
(see Figure C2.2). While the index of annual population growth increased to 180 between 
1950 and 1990, the index of the annual growth rate - after initially increasing to about 115 in 
the early 1970s - slightly fell to below 100 in 1990. The index of the Total Fertility Rate, 
however, significantly declined to 67 in 1990 as compared to 100 in 1950 - a worldwide drop 
in fertility by about 33%. 
This "paradox" of population growth during a time of fertility decline is simply a consequence 
of the fact that the increase in the number of parents outpaced the decline in fertility. In fact, 
this situation will continue for some time to come. According to the most recent UN 
projections we will have a stable annual increase of about 80 million people until 2015 - only 
then will this increase gradually decline to about 47 million in 2050. By the middle of the next 
century the world's population will still grow by about the same number of people as in 1950 - 
only the total number of people on the planet will be more than three times larger. 
How accurate are population projections? 
There is general agreement among demographers that population projections - properly done - 
are fairly accurate for some 5 to 10 years. In the short run not much can go wrong with 
population predictions because of the two factors discussed above: the demographic 
momentum and the relative stability of reproductive behavior and mortality. In fact, it was 
shown that even simple trend extrapolations are usually fairly accurate in the short run. 
Projections for more than two or three decades, however, are much more problematic. They 
increasingly depend on the reproductive behavior of generations not yet born. There is also 
the possibility of an unforeseeable breakthrough in medical science that would affect life 
expectancy. And finally, one cannot predict economic and political revolutions such as the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and the radical change in Eastern Europe which all have 
significantly affected fertility and mortality. 
The core problem of population projections are rapid and fundamental changes in the 
demographic components (fertility, migration and mortality) that "come out of the blue". We 
do not have a causal theory or model which would be robust enough to predict non- 
continuous changes in human (reproductive) behavior. There are numerous examples where 
projections have failed miserably due to a certain rapid change in fertility. For instance, most 
projections for developed countries in the early 1960s where much too high, because with the 
experience of a "baby boom" no one had expected the massive drop in fertility during the 
early 1970s and the continuation of below-replacement fertility in the 1980s, and 1990s. 
Projections have also failed because of the principal unpredictability of migration. The 
number of immigrants largely depends on political decisions. It is a - more or less - planned 
process that can be switches on and off voluntarily. 
Even with mortality sudden, completely unpredictable, changes can occur. The emergence and 
rapid spread of AIDS and other transmittable diseases should remind us that there is no 
natural law which guides the smooth increase of life expectancy worldwide. Russia is the 
most dramatic example that a country sometimes can significantly divert from general 
demographic trends. While in recent years mortality further declined in all industrialized 
countries it sharply increased in Russia due to economic and social crises (Eberstadt, 1993; 
Mesle, Shkolnikov and Vallin, 1994; Ryan, 1995; Shkolnikov, Mesle and Vallin, 1996 a and 
b). 
Comparison of various projections 
In Table C2.1 (a and b) I have compiled results from various world population projections, 
including the most recent IIASA World Population Scenarios and the 1996 edition of the UN 
Population Estimates and Projections. There are several remarkable results: 
The "medium" or "central" variants of all projections for the year 2000 are very close - no 
matter whether these projections were prepared in the early 1960s or mid- 1990s. For instance, 
the UN projection from 1993 projected the world population for the year 2000 at 6.13 billion. 
In 1996 the US Bureau of the Census (International Programmes Center) published its "World 
Population Profile" with an estimate of 6.09 for the year 2000. In 198 1 Frejka projected a 6.2 
billion world population for the year 2000 and in 1983 Keyfitz projected a 6.08 billion 
population. 
For the year 2025 we can compare two UN projections, one from 1980 and the most recent 
from 1996: the first has projected the 2025 population at 8.2 billion, the second at 8.04 billion. 
There is also remarkable little variation in the selected "medium" variant projections for the 
year 2050: In 1981 Frejka projected the world population for the year 2050 at 9.89 billion; the 
most recent UN projection in 1996 was 9.37 billion. Only Keyfitz had a more "optimistic" 
estimate for the year 2050 world population, 8.68 billion. 
Table C2.1 also shows the extremely wide range of "variants" or "scenarios" in some of the 
projections. The most recent IIASA World Population Scenarios, for instance, include 
scenarios that range from a projected population of 7.1 billion to 13.3 billion for the year 
2050. The most recent UN projections, on the other hand, have a much lower range of output: 
the low variant projection for 2050 is 7.26; the high variant is 8.08 billion. 
As already mentioned, the United Nations Population Division has a tradition of fine- 
adjusting their assessments with each new round of world population projections. This should 
be seen as a strength rather than a weakness in their approach. In their most recent edition of 
the World Population Trends the UN has somewhat reduced their projections. It is interesting 
to see in which countries the UN thought it necessary to make the biggest adjustments. Table 
C2.2 presents only the differences in population estimates and projections (both as an increase 
or decline in the number of people and as a percentage of the 1994 assessment). The biggest 
adjustment was made for India: the 1996 edition has a projection for 2025 population which is 
almost 62 million smaller than in the 1994 edition. This is a 4.4% lower projection than in the 
1994 edition. Obviously the UN is a little more "optimistic" that India will be able to reduce 
population growth than in the 1994 assessment. 
As one can see in Table C2.2 the UN not only adjusts its projections according to new trends 
in fertility, but also revises the historical population estimates. The population of Russia in 
1950 was estimated more than 1 million lower in the 1996 edition, as compared to the 1994 
edition. 
Finally, it is interesting that most of the differences between the 1994 and 1996 edition of the 
UN World Population Trends is due to adjustments in only 12 countries. The world 
population in 2050 is projected to be some 466 million less in the 1996 edition than in the 
1994 edition. Almost 400 million (of this 466 million difference) is due to adjustments in the 
12 countries listed in Table C2.2. 
What can be done to improve the methodology of population projections? 
Demographers have developed various measures to improve the predictive power of 
population projections, or - at least - to specify their uncertainty. There is, however, no 
consensus which of these methods and techniques should be applied or even, whether it is at 
all possible to increase the validity of population projections (important contributions to this 
debate are from: Keyfitz, 198 1, 1985, 1989; Lee, 1974, 1992; Alho, 1990; Demeny, 1984; 
Frejka, 1981; Keilman, 1990). There are - at least - three approaches to this problem: 
Replace population projections by population scenarios. 
Develop more sophisticated projection techniques - including probabilistic projections. 
Live with the problem, but regularly revise projections. 
Scenario Approach 
Scenarios are defined as "if-then" relationships. A certain set of assumptions - concerning 
fertility, mortality and migration - is made and the researcher then strictly applies numerical 
methods (such as a cohort-component projection) to calculate the demographic consequences. 
It is important to understand that these sets of assumptions do not have to be realistic. For 
instance, one could assume that all vital rates remain constant for the projection period - even 
if it is very likely that they will change. This "constant rates" scenario would then result in a 
"status quo" projection. It would tell us, what would happen - demographically - if the current 
conditions in fertility, mortality or migration remain unchanged. This exercise can be very 
instructive, because the long-range consequences of certain demographic conditions are often 
not obvious. 
Typically, however, one would not only define one "status quo" scenario, but several sets of 
assumptions. These scenarios could be based, for instance, on hypothetical "extremes" in the 
demographic components - such as a "very high fertility - very low mortality" or a "very low 
fertility - very high mortality" scenario. In this case the scenarios would be used to estimate 
upper or lower boundaries for population growth. The IIASA population scenarios have taken 
this approach one step further by systematically combining high and low possibilities in the 
demographic components (Lutz, Sanderson, Scherbov and Goujon, 1996). This resulted in a 9 
different scenarios. 
While the scenario approach is certainly useful for better understanding the consequences of 
certain demographic assumptions, it also has its shortcomings: 
In its most rigorous form the scenario approach does not help the user to choose between the 
different scenarios. They are just presented as "possible alternative futures". The user of the 
projection has to decide which set of assumptions (scenario) is more likely. This is 
particularly frustrating when a large number of scenarios is presented - resulting in extremely 
divergent demographic trends. In essence, a strict scenario approach is an attempt to transfer 
responsibility for the critical decisions from the demographic expert to the user, who is 
usually a non-demographer. 
Knowing about the difficulties of users to choose between a broad range of alternative 
scenarios, some demographers have tried to define "most likely" or "medium variant 
scenarios. This, actually, is in no way different from the traditional approach of population 
projection. In practice, everyone will use the "most likely" scenario results as if they were 
some kind of "old-style" medium variant population projection. 
In essence, the scenario approach in population projections is a "didactic tool" for educating 
the (often non-demographic) audience about the non-obvious consequences of certain 
demographic assumptions. However, it does not solve the basic problem of predicting human 
(reproductive or migration) behavior - namely the possibility of radical changes in human 
(reproductive) behavior and (migration) policy. 
Probability Projections 
The second approach to improve population projections is to use probabilities. Two major 
approaches are discussed in the literature: 
One can use information from past changes in fertility, mortality and migration to estimate the 
probability of certain changes in the future. For instance, one could use the distribution of 
inter-annual changes in fertility during the last 20 years to estimate the probability that the 
fertility rate will increase or decline by a certain margin in the future. If, for example, the (age 
specific) fertility rates only dropped by a small margin from year to year it is unlikely - 
according to this approach - that i t  will jump up by a huge margin in the future. There are 
several highly sophisticated variants in using time-series data to calculate probabilities for 
future changes in the demographic components (Lee, 1974 and 1992), but none of these 
methods does anything to solve the basic problem that the past does not necessarily give us 
hints about the future. Moreover there are numerous technical problems, such as where to 
begin the time-series for the calculation of the probability estimates: Should they go back 
before the "baby boom"? Should they be only for the most recent few years? If we take into 
account fertility data from the "baby boom" and "baby bust" years we automatically end up 
with a much broader probability distribution for our estimates of future fertility. 
The second approach in probabilistic population projections is a variation of the scenario 
method. A panel of demographic experts is asked to estimate the probability of certain 
changes or levels in fertility, mortality or migration (Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov, 1996). 
These probability estimates are then used to calculate a population projection with (various) 
confidence intervals. Unfortunately, it is by no means easier to estimate the probability of a 
certain future fertility range (or level) than just to predict a specific, most likely, level of these 
demographic components. How can one say, for instance, that with 95% probability 
Germany's TFR will be in the range between 1.1 and 1.9 in 2030? This "point-based" 
probability estimates completely depend on the ability of demographic experts to translate 
their intuitive "best guess" estimate of future fertility, mortality or migration levels into 
(quantitative) probabilities. Cognitive research tells us that humans are particularly bad in 
estimating the probability of certain events. For instance, many people are frightened to fly 
because they believe crashes are quite frequent - not realizing that driving their car to the 
airport is the real risk. 
Probability projections use - sometimes excessively - methodological sophistication in order 
to solve the principal problems of predicting human behavior. Unfortunately, they either 
depend on information extracted from historical time-series data or they must rely on the 
cognitive capacity of experts to estimate the probability of future events. While they are 
certainly more complicated than conventional projections, it is rather questionable whether 
they are more accurate. 
Simple Method - but Frequent Revisions 
The third - pragmatic - approach, in my view, is the most realistic. Rather than aiming for a 
more sophisticated projection techniques it tries to continuously fine-adjust a simple 
population projection based on the most recent empirical evidence. The projection is usually 
based on a traditional cohort-component model with a low, medium and high "variant". These 
variants are the results of relatively mechanical, straight-forward assumptions on future trends 
in fertility, mortality and migration. 
This approach is used by the United Nations Population Division in their World Population 
Estimates and Projections. For instance, they simply assume that fertility will converge to a 
level of 2.1 by 2050 at the latest for (almost) all countries worldwide in the medium variant, 
and somewhat higher or lower in the high and low variants (only for 10, mostly European 
countries, the UN assumes that the TFR will be a little lower than 2.1).The UN assumptions 
on mortality and migration are also very simple. While this is certainly not the ultimate 
methodological sophistication in population projection, the approach has proved to be rather 
useful and surprisingly accurate. The UN medium variant is widely used as a best-guess 
projection of future demographic trends. The fertility, mortality and migration assumptions 
are simple, but open for debate. While everyone can question the UN assumption that the TFR 
will be 2.1 in 2050 it is impossible to disagree with an intuitive probability estimates 
generated by a panel of experts. 
Problems Related to World Population Growth 
Is there a fertility decline in the Third World? 
People in developed countries sometimes believe that world population growth could be 
stopped rather quickly, if only the couples in the developing world would reduce their 
fertility. This misconception, unfortunately, is by no means restricted to laymen. It is based on 
the believe that people in the Third World so far have not - or only moderately - reduced the 
number of children. The opposite is the case. As we have demonstrated in Chapter 1 there was 
already a massive decline of fertility in many developing countries since the middle of the 
1970s. And the projections assume a further significant drop. In fact, a world population of 
9.4 billion people by the middle of the next century is only possible, if fertility - on a 
worldwide average - declines to about 2.1 children per woman. 
Figure C3.1 is an attempt to visualize this past and projected fertility transition on a global 
level. It presents the cumulated number of people that lived (or are projected to live) in 
countries below a certain average level of fertility in 1950, 1995 and 2025. In 1950 there were 
no countries that had a Total Fertility Rate of less than 2.1. But some 1.5 billion of the 2.5 
billion world population lived in countries with a Total Fertility Rate of more than 4.7. As can 
be seen from the lower blue line in the chart, only about 500 million people lived in countries 
where the TFR was less than 2.7. 
That had changed significantly by 1995 (see the violet line in Figure C2.1). Now some 2.5 
billion people lived in countries with a TFR of 2.1 or less. And - due to the rapid fertility 
decline in China - some 4.2 billion people lived in countries where the average number of 
children was 3.4 or less. 
A world population of "only" 9.3 billion people by 2050 would require that roughly 6 billion 
people would have to follow a "low fertility" regime - that is, the average TFR in their 
countries would have to be only 2.1 children per women or less. 
We can see some interesting patterns if we study this global fertility decline on a country-by- 
country basis. In Table C2.1 we have sorted all countries according to their changes in 
average Total Fertility Rates between the five-year periods of 1950155 and 1990195. The 
largest (absolute) decline in fertility - according to the 1996 UN estimates - was recorded in 
Thailand: the average number of children per woman dropped from 6.6 to 1.9 children. 
Today, the average Thai family has almost 5 children less than in the early 1950s. 
Singapore is a small country, but in its effort to reduce average family size it is great. In the 
past four decades the average number of children per women dropped by 4.6 - from 6.4 to 1.8. 
Both Thailand and Singapore now have below-replacement level fertility. In the long run this 
would lead to a natural population decline. 
Spectacular declines of fertility in the Third World are not restricted to Asia. A good example 
is the Dominican Republic. Here the average number of children per women fell from 7.4 in 
1950155 to 3.1 in 1990195. The population in Turkey, which had a very high Total Fertility 
Rate of 6.9 in the early 1950s, reduced the average number of children to 2.7 in 1990195. 
There are even African countries with a very significant fertility decline in the past four 
decades: in Mauritius the TFR dropped from 6.3 to 2.4 in 1990195 (today it is even lower). 
The most significant fertility decline, however, has occurred in China. While the population 
increased from 555 million in 1950 to 1.2 billion in 1995, the average fertility dropped from 
6.2 to 1.9 children per women. This UN-estimate of below-replacement fertility for China is 
confirmed by independent demographic research (see for instance: Feeney, 1996). The 
government's strictly executed "one-child" family planning program and the social 
environment of this highly controlled society certainly helped to achieve this widespread 
change in reproductive behavior. But especially in recent years of rapid economic 
development young couples in cities are increasingly favoring postponement of birth and 
small families from their own choice. Due to the size of its population China's fertility decline 
is a crucial factor of world population growth. We have to realize that more couples are 
restricting the number of children in the still very poor developing country of China than in all 
highly developed nations of Europe and Northern America combined. 
To answer the question stated above we can conclude that billions of couples in the Third 
World have already a much lower fertility than their parents. All UN projections (even the 
high fertility variants) assume a further rapid decline of average fertility in the Third World. 
Only then will we observe the projected slow-down of population growth and a leveling off at 
about 10 billion people. 
Will world population growth be stopped by food shortages? 
The race between population and food is one of the oldest themes of (demographic) research - 
and probably one of the most controversial. Since Malthus' essay, 200 years ago, numerous 
books and papers - both scientific and popular - have been written on the issue (see for 
instance: Malthus, 1798; Vogt, 1948; Osborn, 1948; Fremlin, 1964; Ehrlich, 1968; Daily and 
Ehrlich, 1992; Waggoner, 1994; Cohen, 1995). Just summarizing the main arguments of this 
debate would go far beyond the scope of this paper. Elsewhere I have published a more 
detailed analysis (Heilig, 1996). Here, I will only mention a few arguments and facts which 
are essential for understanding the problem. 
We must distinguish food crises from the problem of a population outgrowing the 
carrying capacity of its land. 
There is a long record of severe famines that have affected populations in various places. The 
Irish Famine, the food crisis under Stalin's terror regime, the "Great Leap Forward" in China 
(an euphemism that covered up one of the most massive famines in recorded history), the 
Bengali famine and numerous famines in African countries, such as in Ethiopia and Somalia, 
have all caused the death of millions (Boyle, 1994; Conquest, 1991; Nove, 1990). These tragic 
losses of human life have left deep marks in the age structures of the populations affected - 
some of them still visible today. But they have certainly not slowed down world population 
growth. In fact, many very large famines had only a surprisingly minor impact on the long- 
term population trends - even in the countries where they occurred. One major consequence of 
an acute famine is the increase in infant and child mortality. But parents often replace "lost" 
children some time later, when the food situation has improved again. 
Just consider the case of the two most populous nations on earth: India and China. They both 
have a long history of exceptionally severe famines, before the "Green Revolution" and 
economic reforms improved the food supply for most people in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Especially for India, where floods and monsoons frequently destroyed the harvests, historians 
have documented numerous famines of apocalyptic dimensions, such as the great famine of 
1630-31 which affected all of India or the food crises between 1555 and 1596 in the 
northwestern part of the country (Braudel, 1990). Yet none of these disasters decimated 
India's population in the long run. 
We can identify many obvious reasons for the great famines in history - natural catastrophes, 
such as hurricanes, floods, droughts, crop pests or volcano eruptions; or man-made conditions, 
such as civil wars, trade restrictions, political terror, or forced deportation of peasants as in 
Stalin's terror regime. But to my knowledge there is no clear evidence that any of these 
famines was caused by a population suddenly outgrowing the carrying capacity of their land. 
When the natural disaster was over and the economic or political constraints removed, the 
food situation usually normalized - and very often the population began to grow again. 
A lot has been published on the ecological collapse of past civilizations (Lowe, 1985; Culbert, 
1973; Diamond, 1994). It is, for instance, quite likely that chronic food shortages - triggered 
by a dry period around AD 800 - did contributed to the decline of the Maya civilization 
(Hodell, Curtis and Brenner, 1995; Sabloff, 1990, 1995). But that was certainly only one 
element in a multi-factorial process of socio-economic decline - they didn't just perish all of a 
sudden in a famine. If food constraints really have contributed to the collapse of the Maya 
culture, then it was not an absolute limitation of bio-physical resources which caused the 
decline, but an inability to adapt the technology and the economic, social and political 
organization to the environmental constraints. The correlation between paleoclimatic records 
and the decline of the Classic Maya civilization is not necessarily a causal explanation of the 
collapse. For instance, it does not explain why the Mayas moved from the most seriously 
drought-affected southern lowlands to the northern lowlands (to Chichen Itza, Uxmal, Kabah 
or Sayil) which are not very suitable for agriculture. Why did they not move to the highlands 
where agro-climatic conditions are much better? (see also: Pohl, 1990; Sharer, 1994). 
Famines are a thing of the past for most of the world's people. 
Famines and food shortages were very common throughout human history. In fact, bad 
harvests with subsequent food crises were so frequent in pre-industrial Europe that they 
became a part of everyday life. They shaped traditions and religious practices and affected the 
rise and fall of empires. The ups and downs in food supply (and the repeated spread of 
epidemics) is mirrored in early birth and death records of Parish registers. They show a 
recurrent pattern of excess deaths over births eq+,ery few years. In Asia, the food situation was 
even worse. Much of the recorded history in China deals with food shortages and famines and 
the political disruptions they triggered. We also have historical documents from early 
European travelers to Russia, India and China who reported famines of apocalyptic 
dimension. (For a more detailed discussion of historical trends in food supply see: Walter and 
Schofield, 1989; Watkins and Menken, 1985). 
A high variability in the supply of food was typical for all traditional agriculture - especially 
in tropical regions where climatic hazards are abundant. They lacked the technology and 
economic arrangements to stabilize the food supply that have been invented over the past few 
decades, such as satellite-based early warning systems, emergency food aid or a strategic 
international cereal reserve. These modem measures of food crisis intervention have saved the 
lives of hundreds of millions. But there is a second, even more important, improvement in 
modern agriculture, that gives hope for the future: the enormous increase in productivity that 
could be achieved through artificial fertilizers, pesticides, efficient methods of irrigation and 
high yield varieties of major food and feed crops. Modern agricultural technology and new 
methods of farm management, combined with free access to (international) markets, have 
boosted the production of food during the past few decades - not only in Northern America 
and Europe, but also in Asia and Latin America. 
Today, more people can be fed than ever before. 
Despite gloomy predictions of biologists in the 1960s the global food situation is much better 
today than three or four decades ago. We have not only "survived" a doubling of the human 
population since 1950, but we are able to provide more and better nutrition to a much larger 
section of the world's population. The agricultural productivity gain in industrialized countries 
- further stimulated by production subsidies - was so great that most of them ran into problems 
of over-production. They not only had to reduce subsidies, but also decided to remove arable 
land from cultivation. The modern agricultural revolution, however, had its greatest impact in 
Asia. Consider the case of China: In the 1950s and 1960s, when the population was just 
between 555 and 657 million, the food situation was very critical; in fact in 1959-61 China 
had one of the largest famines in  history. Today, with a population of 1.2 billion, China can 
feed itself. It is estimated that China's economic reforms since 1978 have lifted some 200 
million people out of poverty - a major step to increase food security. Cereal prices on 
international markets have fallen significantly - giving poor food-deficit countries the chance 
to import larger amounts of food. 
Worldwide, the average per capita food calorie supply increased from 2274 to 2709 calories 
per person per day between the three-year interval of 1961163 and 1992194. We eat more fat, 
vitamins and better and more protein than thirty years ago (see Table C3.2). The average per 
capita protein supply increased from 62.6 to 71.6 g per person per day. In Asia the increase 
was most spectacular: the average calorie supply grew from 1865 to 2577 calories per person 
per day; the average protein supply increased from 47.2 to 63.9 g per person per day. In the 
"Least Developed Countries" (which include some 50 poor developing countries) the average 
food situation, unfortunately, improved only marginally from 2012 calories per person in 
1961193 to 2032 calories per capita in 1992194. This worldwide increase in food supply has 
certainly contributed to the fact that life expectancy has increased almost everywhere. The 
infant mortality of now is a small fraction of what it was when the world's population was 
only half as large as today. 
Hunger and under-nutrition have remained the fate of millions. 
Of course, there is still much hunger and under-nutrition in our world. Numbers are quite 
controversial, but the general trend is clear: In the early 1990s the FA0 published a detailed 
study which analyzed chronic under-nutrition in 93 developing countries. According to these 
estimates, the number of undernourished people worldwide declined from 941 million in 
1969171 to 781 million in 1988190 while the population increased from 2.6 to 3.9 billion. 
Hence, the percentage of people with insufficient diet significantly declined from 36% of the 
world population in 1969171 to 20% in 1988190. And in the 1990s the situation further 
improved. Especially Asia could reduce the number of malnourished people. New estimates 
for the second half of the 1990s are not available, but taking into account China's increase in 
per capita food production since 1980, an estimate of some 500 million undernourished 
people is not unreasonable. 
This chronic under-nutrition is a tragedy, but i t  is overwhelmingly not caused by bio-physical 
limitations of agriculture, but by economic, social and political deficiencies in certain 
countries, such as extreme poverty or inefficient and unfair systems of food distribution. For 
instance, it is not the soil conditions or the climate or population growth which have caused 
the near collapse of agriculture in Russia and the Ukraine in  the early 1990s. Corruption, 
bureaucratic inefficiency, and the rigidity of a centralized command agriculture were the core 
problems of Russia's deficient food supply. Poverty plays a major role in India's food 
problems. While the country has experienced rapid economic development with a major 
increase in living standards among a growing (urban) middle class, a large section of the rural 
population still lives in absolute poverty. The scandal of under-nutrition in the face of 
abundance in India is the inability or unwillingness of the ruling classes (and casts) to share 
some of their wealth with the poor. However, nowhere is the link between under-nutrition and 
policy failure more obvious than in Africa. Civil war, corruption, economic mismanagement, 
the lack of agricultural infrastructure investment, failure to promote agricultural training, or 
radical economic experiments have played major roles in all recent African food crises. 
The battle to feed all of humanity is not over yet. 
In 1968 Paul Ehrlich wrote: "The battle to feed all of humanity is over" because he believed 
that world population growth would soon hit biophysical limits of sustenance (Ehrlich, 1968). 
He was wrong. We are still fighting. But our chances to win are not bad. We can be 
optimistic, because we have seen the remarkable effects of agricultural modernization and 
policy reform in Asia - especially in China. We are now much more aware of what is causing 
chronical under-nutrition and triggering acute famine than 30 years ago. Usually, it is not bio- 
physical limitation, but policy failure and lack of socio-cultural change. Depending on model 
assumptions, only some 25 to 35 percent of the world's potential arable land is now under 
cultivation and current crop yields are well below their theoretical maxima in many parts of 
the developing world - especially in Latin America and Africa. In a study of developing 
countries (excluding China) the FA0 has estimated that from an area of 2570 million hectares 
with rainfed crops production potential only 760 million hectares (or 30%) are currently used 
in crop production. 
The challenge of the world food problem is to bring the high-productivity agriculture - that 
was so successful in Europe, Northern America and parts of Asia to those developing 
countries where agricultural productivity is still very low - and utilize the advantages of food 
trade in our global economic system.. This will require major social, economic and political 
reforms in these countries. 
There is no indication that the world population is approaching physical limits of food 
production in the foreseeable future. 
Those who continue to predict population growth running into agricultural resource 
constraints hold on to a serious misconception of how human sustenance is generated in the 
20th and 21st century. They believe - as Ehrlich wrote - that "human carrying capacity is the 
long-term ability of an area to support human beings" (Ehrlich, 1968). The critical phrase here 
is "area". It suggests that human sustenance is primarily based on the bio-physical 
characteristics of a certain territory. This was certainly correct for neolithical tribes, but it is 
simply wrong for at least 200 years. The well-being of a modern, industrial society depends 
on its ability to promote and efficiently organize economic activities outside the agricultural 
sector, often even outside their own country - in research and development, in industry, in 
international trade, in banking, in tourism and other service sectors. Those, who succeed in 
these economic activities can buy food on the world market if their own territory is unsuited 
for food production - or even grow wheat in the desert, as do some of the oil-exporting nations 
in Western Asia and Northern Africa. If the price is right, farmers in resource-rich countries, 
such as Canada, the United States of America or Brazil would be more than willing and able 
to supply international markets with additional amounts of food and feed grain. Even Russia 
could produce for the international market if they would cultivate their land with "western" 
productivity. Were they properly managed, the large arable land of the Ukraine could feed 
many more people than actually live there (before World War I1 the Ukraine was a major food 
exporter to Western Europe). Even parts of Africa, such as Sudan, have huge resources of 
arable land, sufficient water and adequate climate conditions. As a well-known FAO-IIASA 
study has shown, Sudan has a population supporting capacity of up to a billion people - twice 
the actual population of Africa (FAOfiIASAiUNFPA, 1982). 
In its landmark study on World Agricultural: Towards 2010, the F A 0  has concluded that 
"there appear to be no insurmountable resources and technology constraints at the global level 
that would stand in the way of increasing world food supplies by as much as required by the 
growth of effective demand. And, on balance, there is scope for such growth in production to 
be achieved while taking measures to shift agriculture on to a more sustainable production 
path."(Alexandratos, 1995). 
Would a smaller world population be more "sustainable"? 
Those, who entertain the public with "doomsday scenarios" of looming global food or health 
crises often argue that small populations separated by undisturbed natural environment would 
be more healthy and "sustainable" (whatever that means). So let's go back in history to the 
"golden ages", when the world was an almost empty place. From paleo-demographic research 
we know that for most of human history the world population consisted of small tribes - each 
of a few dozen people - isolated from each other through vast areas of natural land. However, 
these ancient people lived short lives - often on the brink of starvation. Their remains 
frequently show signs of multiple chronically diseases, poor nutritional status and injuries 
related to violent conflicts. Most of their children died in the first few years. If they survived 
childhood they rarely became older than 35 years. We know of several (ancient) civilizations 
that vanished from earth despite (or maybe because) they lived thinly scattered over vast areas 
of almost natural, undisturbed land. 
Even in more recent history the mighty Greek or Roman empires only had a tiny population as 
compared with today's populous countries in Asia or Africa. During the time of the 
"Peloponnesian War" in the middle of the 5th century B.C. (it was the peak period of ancient 
Greece) the city of Athens had a total population of just 133 to 173 thousand (Ploetz, 1986). 
In the eleventh century Europe's large cities typically had less than 10,000 inhabitants - but 
even places with more than 500 inhabitants were considered a town. The city of Rome, 
"center of the world" for hundreds of years, never had a population of more than 200,000 
people before the 18th century. Compared to the mega-cities of today with 10, 20 or even 30 
million inhabitants these historical settlements were idyllic places. Yet, their population 
incredibly suffered from poor sanitation, lethal epidemics and frequent devastation due to war 
or fire. 
At the beginning of the 14th century European populations typically were smaller than that of 
average Asian cities today. Most people lived in small rural settlements which were separated 
by huge areas of virgin land. It was estimated that in 1340 Italy's population was about 10 
million; the British islands had a population of only some 5 million; France and the 
Netherlands had a total population of 19 million and Germany some 11.5 million (Ploetz, 
1986). Living in an almost undisturbed natural environment this small and dispersed 
populations, however, suffered the greatest public health crises in recorded history: the 
bubonic plague. Within a century one third (or more) of the European population was killed. 
By the middle of the 15th century Italy's population had declined by 2.5 million (25%); on the 
British islands the population decline was in the order of 2 million (40%); the population in 
France and the Netherlands shrank by 7 million (or 37%); and Germany's population fell by 4 
million (35%). But even this massive epidemic did not stop Europe's population growth in the 
long run. Only a century later the population had recovered. 
Is there a social upper limit to population density? 
Some people have argued that increasing population density will trigger a process of social 
erosion and disintegration. Experiments with rats and other animals have shown that stress 
related to population density can affect the social structure and individual health of the 
animals. However, this cultural and social doomsday scenario is by no means more likely than 
the dire food crisis predictions. There are few urban places in the world where crime rates are 
lower and average (healthy) life expectancy is higher than - for instance - in the extremely 
densely populated urban agglomerate of Tokyo-Yokohama, Japan. Even the densely 
populated "urban jungle" of New York or Washington is a rather healthy and kind 
environment for people - if compared to the sparsely populated villages of Zaire, Sudan or the 
Ukraine (to select just three of the many rural crises regions). Recently, New York City has 
demonstrated that it is possible to lower crime rates even in places of extreme concentration of 
population and social problems. One might argue that it is unfair to compare highly developed 
urban areas with villages in poor countries. But it is easy to find other examples: China's very 
poor rural population has one of the highest densities in the world - yet their life expectancy 
and infant mortality is lower, and their nutritional and health status, better than in most parts 
of sparsely populated Africa, Latin America or Russia. High population density as such has 
little influence on human well-being. And it is certainly not a limiting factor of further 
population growth. 
Of course, we have serious public health crises or events of social disintegration in certain 
countries or regions which have even increased national mortality rates, such as in certain 
African countries or Russia (Shkolnikov, Mesle and Vallin, 1996; Ryan, 1995). But they are 
man-made. They are caused by inadequate political, social and economic structures, which 
could be (and have been in other countries) changed by a competent political administration 
andlor by individual behavioral change. Human populations do not act like rats in a cage. 
Other than these rodents, they can intentionally modify their social conditions and individual 
behavior in order to adapt to a more densely populated world. This socio-economic 
adaptability to population growth is frequently ignored in Global Change research which is 
focused on the bio-geophysical aspects. 
In my view, the successful adaptation of billions of people worldwide to an urban-industrial 
environment is one of the most interesting characteristics of global change. Only a few 
generations ago the majority of the world's population lived from agriculture and settled in 
small villages and towns - usually under quite harsh conditions with high (infant) mortality 
and fertility, frequent famines and poverty. Today a large section of the (much larger) world 
population has not only changed (and improved) its mode of sustenance, but also adapted to 
the living environment of urban-industrial complexes with multi-million inhabitants and 
unprecedented population density. Many of us (including the author) might not like living in 
crowded cities - but we cannot ignore the fact that the concentration of people into an urban- 
industrial world was a highly successful organizational innovation in human evolution. In 
fact, with a projected 10 billion people on the globe, we will be able to reserve some space for 
nature only if the human population can be concentrated in compact, high-density urban 
agglomerates. 
Will AIDS stop world population growth? 
While there is no evidence that traditional health crises are able to limit world population 
growth new types of diseases might be more devastating. The obvious example is AIDS. For 
demographers dealing with population projections this is one of the most interesting questions 
and many studies have investigated the problem (see for instance: Bongaarts, 1996; US 
Bureau of Statistics, 1996). Of course, no one can be sure about the future spread of HIV, but 
from our current knowledge it  seems to be unlikely that the AIDS epidemic will have a 
significant effect on world population growth. The reasons are the following: 
First, there is not one large uniform HIV epidemic spreading across the world population, but 
many distinct epidemics. Each one has its own origin, its specific transmission patterns and 
social background. Each one involves a certain risk behavior and is open to different types of 
prevention measures. Homosexual men, drug addicts, sharing injection needles, prostitutes 
and their clients, and heterosexual people who practice unprotected sex with multiple partners 
have a much higher probability of getting infected than those who avoid this practices. This is 
the reason while after more than 15 years of HIV spread in Europe still 76 percent of all AIDS 
cases diagnosed in 1996 were either homohi-sexual men or injecting drug users. Only 14% of 
the newly diagnosed AIDS cases were heterosexual men and women - many of these were 
partners of intravenous (IV) drug users. For instance, 3 1% of heterosexually infected female 
AIDS patients were partners of IV drug users (European Centre for the Epidemiological 
Monitoring of AIDS, 1996). In Europe, HIV so far has spread mainly among people with 
specific kinds of risky behavior that are not practiced by the great majority of the population. 
In fact, the available statistics indicate that in Europe - especially in Northern Europe - the 
AIDS incidence seems to have stabilized. The situation, obviously, is quite different in Africa, 
where a high prevalence of HIV infection is reported among the "general population". Several 
studies have demonstrated that HIV-related diseases are already the leading cause of death for 
young adults in many African cities (for instance in Abidjan). Rapid increases of HIV 
infections and AIDS cases were recently reported from India and Thailand. But these 
epidemics also seem to spread mainly among IV drug users, prostitutes and their customers 
and homosexual men with multiple, unprotected sex contacts. In any case, it is clear now that 
the AIDS disease is the result of a compartmented epidemic which is closely linked to 
behavioral and cultural patterns - not comparable, for instance, to the Black Death in the 
Middle Ages that swept more or less indiscriminately over Europe's population. 
Second, while AIDS in Africa South of the Sahara has already increased infant and adult 
mortality rates by as much as 5096, the impact on fertility is much smaller. A large percentage 
of HIV-infected women will contract the virus only after they have already given birth to one 
or more children, because fertility is still very high and the average child-bearing age is very 
low. And even after having been infected with the AIDS virus pregnancies are likely - due to 
the 8 to 10 year asymptomatic incubation period of HIV. Some 30% of these babies born by 
HIV infected mothers will not carry the virus (in Europe and Northern America mother-to- 
child transmission does not occur in about 50 to 60 percent of the pregnancies of HIV infected 
mothers). In Africa, AIDS typically kills people in their early 30s - an age where much of the 
reproductive period is already completed. AIDS is undoubtedly a major public health crisis in 
Africa South of the Sahara - but its demographic effects are restricted to the increase of adult 
and infant mortality rates. Population growth rates will not be affected much due to the still 
high level of fertility and the massive demographic momentum built into the young age 
structure of African populations. 
Third, the situation in Asia is unclear. Despite much higher HIV prevalence rates in Africa, 
AIDS could potentially have a greater impact on population growth in Asia due to the much 
lower initial fertility. On the other hand it seems unlikely that all of Asia would be affected in 
a similar way. China, for instance, has so far reported very few AIDS cases. 
In conclusion, we can assume for the moment that AIDS has no great overall demographic 
effect in Europe and Northern America. It increases mortality patterns in certain geographical 
regions and age groups, but not to such an extent that it would affect overall population 
growth. Despite very high rates of HIV prevalence and increasing mortality AIDS will 
probably only moderately slow down Africa's population growth. And in Asia - so far - many 
countries show no sign of rapidly spreading HIV infections. 
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Table C1.l: Regions: Total Population by Variant in 1950, 1995, 2025 and 2050 (in 1000) 
Low, Medium and High UN Projection Variant, 1996 Edition. 
Source: UN Population Division (1 997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. (Annex I and II). 
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369.01 6 384,054 
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87 1 1.059 
1,159,255 1,631,820 
Table C1.2: Major Regions: Total Population, 1950, 1995, 2025 and 2050 (in 1000) and 
Population Change, 1950-1995, 1995-2025, 2025-2050 and 1950-2050 (in 1000 and in %) 
(Medium Variant UN Projection, 1996 Edition). 
Source: UN Population Division (1 997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. (Annex I and II). 
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Table C1.3: The 10 countries with the highest population increase between 1950-1995, 
1995-2025, 2025-2050 and 1950-2050. (All Data: UN Medium Variant Projection, 1996 
Edition). 
Past Population Increase, Projected Population Increase, 
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Source: UN Population Division ( I  996): World Population Prospects, 19.50-20.50. The 1996 
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Table C1.4: Average Annual Population Growth Rates, 1950-1995, 1995-2025, 2025-2050 
and 1950-2050 (All Data: Medium Variant UN Projection, 1996 Edition). 
Past Population Growth, 1950-1995 
Population Growth Rates (in %) 
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Angola 
Centennial Population Growth, 1950-2050 
Population Growth Rates (in %) 
I Exponential1 Av. Annual 







Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Gaza Strip 
Niger 
Source: UN Population Division (1  997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. 1996 
Edition. (Annex I and II). Note: The exponential growth rate was calculated with the formula: 
r = (log(Pn / Po)) / n log e. The average annual growth rate is the mean of the reported five- 
year annual averages. 
Table C1.5: Total Population (in 1000) and Proportion of Global Population by Region (in 
%), 1950, 1995, 2025 and 2050. (All Data: Medium Variant UN Projection, 1996 Edition). 
Source: UN Population Division (1  997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. (Annex I and II). 
Percentage  o f  World Pop. 
1950 1995 2025 2050 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
32.2 20.6 15.2 12.4 
67.8 79.4 84.8 87.6 
8.9 12.7 18.1 21.8 
2.6 3.9 6.0 7.5 
1.0 1.5 2.3 3.0 
2.1 2.8 3.2 3.4 
0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 
2.5 3.7 5.6 6.8 
6.6 8.4 8.6 8.7 
0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 
1.5 2.2 2.4 2.5 
4.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 
6.8 5.2 4.6 4.1 
55.6 60.4 59.5 58.1 
26.6 25.0 21.1 18.4 
7.2 8.5 8.6 8.7 
19.8 24.0 26.1 26.9 
2.0 2.9 3.7 4.1 
21.7 12.8 8.7 6.8 
8.7 5.5 3.5 2.7 
3.1 1.6 1.2 1.0 
4.3 2.5 1.7 1.3 
5.6 3.2 2.3 1.8 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7.8 10.2 14.4 17.4 
Total  Populat ion (in 1000) 
1950 1995 2025 2050 
World Total 12,523,878 5,687,113 8,039,130 9,366,724 
More Dev. Regions 
LessDev.Regions 
812,687 1,171,384 1,220,250 1,161,741 



























Least Dev. Count. 
223,974 719.495 1,453,899 2,046,401 
65,624 221.315 480,182 698.596 
26,316 83,271 187,525 284,821 
53.302 158,077 256,716 317,267 
15.581 47.335 82,901 106,824 
63,151 209,498 446,574 638.892 
166,337 476,637 689,618 810.433 
17,039 35.686 48.21 1 56,229 
36,925 123,474 189,143 230,425 
112.372 317,477 452,265 523,778 
171,617 296,645 369.016 384,054 
1.402.021 3.437.787 4,784.833 5.442.567 
671,156 1,421,314 1,695.469 1,722,380 
182.035 481,920 691,911 81 1,891 
498.583 1,366,866 2,100,034 2,521,304 
50.247 167,686 297.420 386.992 
547.318 728.244 701,077 637,585 
219,296 310,506 284,170 255,955 
78,094 93,372 95,593 94,194 
109,012 143,377 137,196 119,887 
140,916 180,988 184,118 167,550 
12.612 28,305 40,687 45,684 
10.127 21.427 28,809 30,557 
2,095 5.814 10,150 12.972 
153 48 1 857 1,097 
237 583 87 1 1,059 
197.572 579,035 1.159.255 1.631.820 
Table C2.1: Comparison of Various Population Projections. 
Notes: I 1  For 1994 12 For 1996 
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1994 Edition 
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IIASA, 1996 Probabilistic 
Projections: Merged 
Mean 
2.5% Confidence I n t e ~ .  
97.5% Conficence I n t e ~ .  
Difference: Highest-Lowest 
1950 1995 2000 2020 2025 2050 2100 
6,046 8,762 9,208 
p Z q  9,8891 10,778 
6,353 11,015 12,348 
307 2,253 3,140 
5.892 8,198 
p F q  pFq 
6,466 10,677 
574 2,479 
2,515 5109 5449 
2,515 5648- 
2,515 6326 6994 
0 1,217 1,545 
2,525 5,496 5,837 6,949 7,168 
2,525 5,6771 6,1191 8,5531 8,195 
2,525 5.823 6,337 7,813 9,135 
0 327 500 864 1,967 
2,520 5,689 6,081 7.372 7,603 7,918 
2,520 5,7161 6,1581 7,8881 8,294- 
2,520 5,742 6,235 8,392 8,979 11,912 
0 53 154 1,020 1,376 3,994 
2,524 5.687 6,062 7,264 7,474 7,662 
2,524 5,6871 6,0911 7,6721 8,039- 
2,524 5,687 6,123 8,062 8,581 11,156 







5,702 p F q  9,8741 10,350 
5,702 7,261 7,103 3,937 
5,702 7,723 9,021 8,120 
5,702 8,191 11,300 15,070 
5,702 7,408 7.802 5,134 
5,702 8,356 12,330 18,950 
5.702 7,547 8,488 6,507 
5,702 8,026 10,690 12,680 
5,702 8,510 13,300 22,740 
0 1,249 6,197 18,803 
5,702 9,9841 10,909 
5,702 7,474 8,108 5,715 
5,702 8,290 11,950 17.330 
0 816 3,842 11,615 
Table C2.1: Comparison of Various Population Projections. 
Sources: 
(i) Frejka, T. (1981): Long-term prospects for world population growth. In: Population and 
Development Review, Vol. 7, No. 3,489-51 1. 
(ii) Keyfitz, N., Allen, E., Edmonds, R., Dougher, R. and Wiget, B. (1983): Global 
Population (1 975-2075) and Labor Force (1 975-2050). 
(iii) Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, ORAUJIEA-83-6(M). 
Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 
(iv) United Nations (1966): World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1963. Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs. UN Population Division. Population Studies No. 41. 
(v) United Nations (198 1): World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1980. New York. UN 
Population Division. 
(vi) United Nations (1995): World Population Prospects. The 1994 Revision. New York. UN 
Population Division. 
(vii) United Nations (to be published in 1997): World Population Prospects. The 1996 
Revision. Annexes I and 11. New York. UN Population Division. 
(viii) US Bureau of the Census (1994): World Population Profile: 1994. With a Special 
Chapter Focusing on HIVIAIDS prepared by Peter 0 .  Way and Karen A. Stanecki. 
Washington, D.C. (Report prepared by Ellen Jamison and Frank Hobbs of the International 
Programs Center (IPC), Population Division, US Bureau of the Census, Report WP194). 
(ix) US Bureau of the Census (1996): World Population Profile: 1966. With a Special 
Chapter Focusing on Adolescent Fertility in the Developing World. Washington, D.C. 
(Report prepared by Thomas M. McDevitt of the International Programs Center (IPC), 
Population Division, US Bureau of the Census, Report WP196). 
(x) Lutz, W. (Ed.) (1996): The Future Population of the World. What Can We Assume 
Today? Revised Edition. London. (Earthscan Publications Ltd.). 
Table C2.2: Comparison of the 1994 and 1996 UN Medium Variant Population Assessments 
and Projections. 












Syrian Arab Republic 
Sum of 12 countries 
Sources: 
United Nations (1995): World Population Prospects. The 1994 Revision. New York, UN 
Population Division. 
United Nations (to be published in 1997): World Population Prospects: The 1996 Revision. 
Annexes I and 11. New York, UN Population Division. 
Differences between the 1994 and 1996 Edition of the 
World Population Assessments and Projections 
(in thousands) 
1950 1995 2025 2050 
0 -6,739 -61,885 -107,189 
0 -1,238 -45,676 -89,327 
0 -559 -12,420 -29,735 
0 -1,111 -13,158 -26,140 
0 -1,391 -1 1,538 -24,882 
0 -4,240 -15,923 -24,135 
531 -2,775 -13,654 -21,090 
0 -2,204 -16,148 -20,324 
-1,091 1,460 -7,153 -15,513 
0 -752 -8,044 -13,857 
0 -1,421 -7,921 -13,673 
0 -458 -7,202 -12,749 
-560 -21,428 -220,722 -398,614 
(in percent) 
1950 1995 2025 2050 
0.0 -0.7 -4.4 -6.5 
0.0 -0.1 -3.0 -5.6 
0.0 -3.9 -33.7 -48.4 
0.0 -3.9 -20.8 -28.4 
0.0 -5.0 -19.8 -29.3 
0.0 -3.0 -5.6 -6.3 
1.0 -1.7 -5.9 -8.0 
0.0 -1.8 -8.2 -8.5 
-1.1 1.0 -5.2 -11.9 
0.0 -1.0 -6.8 -9.6 
0.0 -3.1 -10.5 -14.5 
0.0 -3.1 -21.5 -27.0 
Table C3.1: Countries with highest I lowest Fertility Decline between 1950155 and 1990195 
(Based on UN Estimates and Medium Variant Projection, 1996 Edition). 
Countries with the highest decline in the Total Fertility Rate between 1950155 and 1990195 





















Source: UN Population Division (1 997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. (Annex I and 11) Chart: G.K. Heilig, 1996, IIASA-LUC 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 
1990/95 1990/95 2020l25 2045150 
6.6 1.9 2.0 2.1 
6.4 1.8 2.1 2.1 
7.4 3.1 2.1 2.1 
6.2 1.9 2.1 2.1 
6.9 2.7 2.1 2.1 
6.7 2.6 2.1 2.1 
7.2 3.1 2.1 2.1 
7.0 3.0 2.1 2.1 
6.3 2.4 2.1 2.1 
6.7 2.7 2.1 2.1 
6.6 2.7 2.1 2.1 
6.8 2.9 2.1 2.1 
8.0 4.2 2.1 2.1 
5.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 
6.9 3.1 2.1 2.1 
6.2 2.4 2.1 2.1 
5.7 2.1 2.1 2.1 
6.9 3.3 2.1 2.1 
6.6 3.0 2.1 2.1 





















Change of Total Fertility Rate 
1950155 - 
1990195 1990195 - 2020125 - 1950155 - 
sorted 2020l25 2045150 2045150 
-4.7 0.1 0.1 -4.5 
-4.6 0.3 0.0 -4.3 
-4.3 -1 .O 0.0 -5.3 
-4.3 0.2 0.0 -4.1 
-4.2 -0.6 0.0 -4.8 
-4.1 -0.5 0.0 -4.6 
-4.1 -1 .O 0.0 -5.1 
-4.0 -0.9 0.0 -4.9 
-3.9 -0.3 0.0 -4.2 
-3.9 -0.6 0.0 -4.6 
-3.9 -0.6 0.0 -4.5 
-3.8 -0.8 0.0 -4.7 
-3.8 -2.1 0.0 -5.9 
-3.8 0.3 0.2 -3.3 
-3.8 -1 .O 0.0 -4.8 
-3.7 -0.3 0.0 -4.1 
-3.7 0.1 0.0 -3.6 
-3.7 -1.2 0.0 -4.8 
-3.6 -0.9 0.0 -4.5 
-3.6 -0.8 -0.2 -4.6 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 
1950-55 1990-95 2020-25 1 990195 
7.1 7.1 4.1 2.1 
7.2 7.2 4.4 2.1 
5.7 5.7 3.3 2.1 
5.8 5.9 3.6 2.1 
6.9 7.1 4.0 2.1 
6.7 6.9 3.9 2.1 
7.1 7.4 4.3 2.1 
6.2 6.5 3.9 2.1 
5.5 5.9 3.6 2.1 
6.1 6.5 3.9 2.1 
6.8 7.2 4.1 2.1 
6.3 6.8 4.0 2.1 
6.2 6.7 2.9 2.1 
5.7 6.3 3.8 2.1 
6.0 6.7 3.9 2.1 
5.1 5.8 3.6 2.1 
6.3 7.1 3.9 2.1 
6.4 7.2 4.1 2.1 
4.1 5.0 3.3 2.1 
7.4 8.8 5.1 2.1 
Change of Total Fertility Rate 
1950155 - 
1990195 1990195 - 2020125 - 1950155 - 
sorted 2020125 2045150 2045150 
0.0 -3.0 -2.0 -5.0 
0.0 -2.8 -2.3 -5.1 
0.0 -2.4 -1.2 -3.6 
0.1 -2.3 -1.5 -3.7 
0.2 -3.1 -1.9 -4.8 
0.2 -3.0 -1.8 -4.6 
0.3 -3.1 -2.2 -5.0 
0.3 -2.6 -1.8 -4.1 
0.4 -2.3 -1.5 -3.4 
0.4 -2.6 -1.8 -4.0 
0.4 -3.1 -2.0 -4.7 
0.5 -2.8 -1.9 -4.2 
0.5 -3.8 -0.8 -4.1 
0.6 -2.5 -1.7 -3.6 
0.7 -2.8 -1.8 -3.9 
0.7 -2.2 -1.5 -3.0 
0.8 -3.2 -1.8 -4.2 
0.8 -3.1 -2.0 -4.3 
0.9 -1.7 -1.2 -2.0 
1.4 -3.8 -3.0 -5.3 
Table C3.2: Average Per Capita Supply of Calories, Fat and Protein. 










Least Developed Calories 
Fat 
Protein 
Latin America Calories 
Fat 
Protein 




































Table C3.3: Estimates of Under-nutrition in 93 Developing Countries. 
Note: 
Persons who, on average during the course of a year, are estimated to have food consumption levels below those 
required to maintain body weight and support light activity. This threshold level (ranging from an average of 
1760 callpersonlday for Asia to 1985 for Latin America) is set equal to 1.54 times the basal metabolic rate. 
Afrlca (sub-Sahara) 
Near East l North Afrlca 
East Asla 
South Asla 
Latln Arnerlca & Carrlbean 
Total 
Source: Alexandratos, N. (Ed.) (1995): World Agriculture Towards 2010. An F A 0  Study. 
Rome (FAO, John Wiley & Sons). 
Total Population (rnllllons) 
1969/71 1979181 1988190 
268 358 473 
178 233 297 
1147 1392 1598 
71 1 892 1103 
281 357 433 
2585 3232 3905 
Undernourished 
(rnllllons) 
1969/71 1979181 1988190 
94 129 175 
42 23 24 
506 366 258 
245 278 265 
54 47 59 
941 843 781 
Undernourished 
(% of Total Pop.) 
1969/7 1 1979181 1988190 
35 36 37 
24 10 8 
44 26 16 
34 3 1 24 
19 13 14 
36 26 20 

Figure C1.l: World, 1950 - 1995: Total Population (in billion) and Average Number of 
Children (Total Fertility Rate, TFR) High, Medium and Low Variants. 
World I -.- 
Source: UN Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. (Annex I and 11). 
Figure C1.2: World, 1950 - 2050: Annual Population Increase (in million) and Average 
Number of Children per Woman (TFR) UN Low, Medium and High Variants, 1996 Edition. 
t;;;;r Increase of Tot. Pop. (Med.) 
" U- 
Source: UN Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition (Annex I and 11). 
Figure C1.3: Total Population by Region, 1950, 1995, 2025, and 2050 (in million) UN 
Medium Variant. 
Oceania Northern Latin Am. Africa Europe Asia 
America & Carib. 
Source: UN Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. (Annex I and 11). 
Figure C1.4: China & India, 1950 - 2050: Total Population (in billion) High, Medium 
Low Variants. 
+China: Tot. Pop. (Medium) 
+China: Tot. Pop. (Low) 
U India: Tot. Pop. (High) 
+India: Tot. Pop. (Medium) 
Source: UN Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 
Edition. (Annex I and 11). 
Figure C1.5: China & India, 1995: Total Population by Age and Sex. UN Medium Variant. 




Source: UN Population Division (1995): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1994 
Edition. (Electronic Data Base on Diskettes). 
Figure C1.6: Nigeria and Pakistan, 1950 - 2050: Total Population (in million) and Average 
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Source: UN Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. (Annexes I and 11). 
Figure C1.7: Total Number of Children (< 15 years of age) and Elderly (65+). Medium 
Variant UN Projection, 1996. 
- 
I 
-o- Children: Low Variant 
1 
1 1  1 1 1 1  1 1 , 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 1 1  
Source: UN Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition (Annexes I and 11). 
Figure C2.1: Less Developed Countries: Age Structure, 1950 and 1995. 
Male Female 
Source: UN Population Division (1997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. (Annex I and 11). 
Figure C2.2: Indices of Av. Annual Population Increase, Growth Rate of the Population, 
Total Fertility Rate, Crude Birth Rate, and Infant Mortality Rate, 1950-55 = 100. (UN 
Medium Variant Projection, 1996 Edition). 
A v .  Annual Increase 
+Av. Ann. Growth Rate 
+Crude Birth Rate 
-0- Total Fertility Rate 
Source: UN Population Division (1976): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. (Annexes I and 11). 
Figure C3.1: World: Cumulative Number of People Living in Countries of the Specified 
Average Total Fertility Rate (Number of Children per Woman) (Based on UN Estimates and 
Medium Variant Projection, 1996 Edition). 
In 2025 some 6 billion people are 
projected to live in countries with a 
TFR of less than 2.1 
1995 some 2.5 billion people 
were living in countries with a TFR 
of less than 2.1 
"LO*-:=?" . - . - , - c i  2 0 v=J?:'=?z;; y-?$c?~~~ 
Total Fertility Rate (Number of Children per Woman) 
Source: UN Population Division (1 997): World Population Prospects, 1950-2050. The 1996 
Edition. (Annex I and 11). 
Figure C3.2: Indices of Per Capita Average Calorie, Fat, and Protein Supply: World, Africa, 
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Source: F A 0  (1996): FAOSTAT Electronic Data Base. Rome. 
